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OPINION OF THE COURT 
                     
 
 
 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 In this appeal, we consider whether a group of former 
residents and occasional visitors to a neighborhood containing a 
toxic site were "known" creditors entitled to actual written 
notice of the debtor's bankruptcy filing and bar claims date.  We 
hold that the members of this group were not known creditors and 
that therefore publication notice satisfied the requirements of 
due process.  However, we also conclude that the district court 
failed to adequately consider whether the group's late filing was 
due to "excusable neglect" and that the district court improperly 
reached the issue of whether their claims had been discharged. 
Accordingly, we will affirm the district court's finding that 
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notice was sufficient but reverse its findings on excusable 
neglect and discharge.   
I. 
 Beginning in 1965, appellee Chemetron Corporation 
("Chemetron") owned and operated a manufacturing facility on 
Harvard Avenue in Cuyahoga Heights, Ohio, as well as a nearby 
landfill on Bert Avenue in Newburgh Heights, Ohio.  From 1965 to 
1972, Chemetron manufactured an antimony oxide catalyst at the 
Harvard Avenue facility in a process that utilized depleted 
uranium.  After catalyst production ceased in 1972, a portion of 
the Harvard Avenue facility was demolished.  In 1975, Chemetron 
placed a quantity of rubble from the Harvard Avenue demolition in 
the Bert Avenue landfill.  Later in 1975, Chemetron sold both 
sites to McGean Chemical Company.  McGean Chemical Co. 
subsequently merged with Rohco, Inc., to become McGean-Rohco, 
Inc., the current owner of both sites. 
 Beginning in 1980, potential problems at the sites 
received significant attention from major newspapers in the 
Cleveland area.  On July 8, 1980, the Cleveland Press reported on 
radiation levels at a site "near Harvard Avenue" in Newburgh 
Heights.  On July 9, 1980, the Cleveland Plain Dealer published a 
similar article.  Related articles appeared in The Plain Dealer 
on September 5 and September 12.  On September 23, 1990, The 
Plain Dealer ran a front-page article on "Cuyahoga County's only 
known radioactive dump."  App. at 289-95.  The September 23 
article quoted Phyllis Jones, the lead plaintiff in this case, 
discussing problems at the sites.  Id. at 295. 
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 Between 1980 and 1988, Chemetron was involved in
 periodic clean-up efforts at both sites at the 
direction of Nuclear Regulatory Commission.  The efficacy of 
these efforts remains dubious.   
 On February 20, 1988, Chemetron and other debtors filed 
a joint petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code in the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District 
of Pennsylvania.  Following Bankruptcy Rule 3003(c)(3), the 
bankruptcy court issued a bar date order, fixing the bar claims 
date at May 31, 1988.  Stated simply, under bankruptcy law, the 
bar claims date is the last day on which existing claims can be 
filed against the debtor.  See discussion Part III, infra.   
 The bar date order required that actual notice be 
provided to all persons known to have claims against the debtors. 
The order required notice to all other claimants by publication 
in the national editions of the New York Times and Wall Street 
Journal.  It is undisputed that the debtors complied with the 
order and, in addition, voluntarily published notice in seven 
other newspapers in areas where they were doing business at the 
time of the filing.  On July 12, 1990, the bankruptcy court 
confirmed Chemetron's reorganization plan. 
 On March 2, 1992, almost four years after the bar 
claims date, twelve years after the first newspaper articles 
detailing problems at the sites, and two years after her comments 
in The Plain Dealer's front page article, Phyllis Jones and 
fourteen other individuals brought suit against Chemetron, McGean 
Chemical Co., and McGean-Rohco, Inc., in the Court of Common 
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Pleas of Cuyahoga County, Ohio.  The suit was later amended to 
name a total of twenty-one plaintiffs.  The gravamen of the 
complaint alleged injury from exposure to toxic chemicals as a 
result of time spent in the Bert Avenue area. 
 Plaintiffs' ties to the Bert Avenue area centered 
around visits to or occupancy of two houses in the vicinity. Only 
two members of the group actually occupied the properties during 
the period from 1965-1975 when Chemetron owned the sites. The 
other members of the group visited the properties periodically, 
ranging from "several times per week," App. at 8, to "weekly," 
App. at 14, to "monthly," App. at 16, to "occasional" visits, 
App. at 9.  The record indicates that the visits stopped in 1985, 
three years prior to Chemetron's bankruptcy petition.  None of 
the plaintiffs currently resides near either site.  Sixteen of 
the plaintiffs still reside in Ohio.  Five of the plaintiffs live 
in Texas. 
 In the state court action, Chemetron moved to dismiss 
the suit, arguing that any such claim had been discharged in 
bankruptcy.  The plaintiffs responded by seeking permission from 
the bankruptcy court to file late claims.  By separate motion, 
plaintiffs sought a declaration from the bankruptcy court that 
their claims had not been discharged by the reorganization plan. 
This second motion was converted to an adversary proceeding. 
 On August 2, 1993, the bankruptcy court granted the 
motion to file late claims, finding that plaintiffs were known 
creditors entitled to actual notice of the bankruptcy proceeding 
and bar claims date.  The bankruptcy court also, sua sponte, 
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permitted the plaintiffs to proceed against Chemetron in the Ohio 
lawsuit and dismissed without prejudice the adversary proceeding. 
 Chemetron appealed to the district court, which 
reversed the grant of the motion to file late claims.  The 
district court held that plaintiffs were not known creditors and 
that publication notice was sufficient.  The district court then 
concluded, without explanation, that plaintiffs' "claims were 
dischargeable and were discharged."  Chemetron v. Jones (In re 
Allegheny Int'l), 170 B.R. 83, 90 (W.D. Pa. 1994).  This appeal 
followed. 
II. 
 Jurisdiction in this appeal is proper pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 158(d).  We review the bankruptcy court's findings of 
fact for clear error, the same standard of review used by the 
district court.  See Universal Minerals, Inc. v. C.A. Hughes & 
Co., 669 F.2d 98, 101-02 (3d Cir. 1981).  When reviewing mixed 
questions of law and fact, we exercise plenary review over the 
bankruptcy court's choice, interpretation, and application of the 
underlying rule of law.  See Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Metro 
Communications, Inc., 945 F.2d 635, 642 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. 
denied, 503 U.S. 937 (1992). 
III. 
 The central issue before us is whether plaintiffs were 
"known" or "unknown" claimants at the time of the bankruptcy 
court's order.  If claimants were "known" creditors, then due 
process entitled them to actual notice of the bankruptcy 
proceedings.  Absent such notice, their suit may proceed.  If 
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claimants were "unknown" creditors, however, then notice by 
publication was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due 
process and their claims are barred, absent some other basis for 
relief.  We hold that the claimants in the instant case were 
"unknown" creditors. 
 Our inquiry is guided by one of the principal purposes 
of bankruptcy law, to secure within a limited period the prompt 
and effectual administration and settlement of the debtor's 
estate.  Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 328 (1966).  To this 
end, Bankruptcy Rule 3003(c) requires that claimants against an 
estate in bankruptcy under Chapter 11 file timely proofs of claim 
in order to participate in a reorganization.  Under Rule 
3003(c)(3), these proofs of claim must be filed prior to a bar 
date established by the bankruptcy court.  After the passage of 
the bar claims date, a claimant cannot participate in the 
reorganization unless she establishes sufficient grounds for the 
failure to file a proof of claim.  See In re Best Products Co., 
140 B.R. 353, 357 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992).  Except for narrow 
statutory exceptions not relevant here, confirmation of the 
debtor's reorganization plan discharges all prior claims against 
the debtor.  11 U.S.C. § 1141; Charter Crude Oil Co. v. Petroleos 
Mexicanos (In re Charter Co.), 125 B.R. 650, 654 (M.D. Fla. 
1991).  
 Inadequate notice is a defect which precludes discharge 
of a claim in bankruptcy.  Due process requires notice that is 
"reasonably calculated to reach all interested parties, 
reasonably conveys all the required information, and permits a 
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reasonable time for a response."  Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Rogers 
(In re Eagle Bus Mfg., Inc.), 62 F.3d 730, 735 (5th Cir. 1995) 
(citation omitted).  For notice purposes, bankruptcy law divides 
claimants into two types, "known" and "unknown."  In re Charter 
Co., 125 B.R. 650, 654 (M.D. Fla. 1991).  Known creditors must be 
provided with actual written notice of a debtor's bankruptcy 
filing and bar claims date.  City of New York v. New York, N. H. 
& H. R. Co., 344 U.S. 293, 296 (1953).  For unknown claimants, 
notification by publication will generally suffice.  See In re 
Argonaut Fin. Serv., Inc., 164 B.R. 107, 112 (N.D. Cal. 1994); In 
re Thomas McKinnon Sec., Inc., 130 B.R. 717, 719-20 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 As characterized by the Supreme Court, a "known" 
creditor is one whose identity is either known or "reasonably 
ascertainable by the debtor."  Tulsa Professional Collection 
Serv., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 490 (1988).  An "unknown" 
creditor is one whose "interests are either conjectural or future 
or, although they could be discovered upon investigation, do not 
in due course of business come to knowledge [of the debtor]." 
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317 
(1950).1 
                                                           
1
 Although Mullane involved the notice due beneficiaries 
on judicial settlement of accounts by the trustee of a common 
trust fund, subsequent courts have interpreted the case to set 
the standard for notice required under the Due Process Clause in 
Chapter 11 bar date cases.  See In re Pettibone Corp., 162 B.R. 
791, 806 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1994); In re R.H. Macy & Co., 161 B.R. 
355, 359 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
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 A creditor's identity is "reasonably ascertainable" if 
that creditor can be identified through "reasonably diligent 
efforts."  Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 798 
n.4 (1983).  Reasonable diligence does not require "impracticable 
and extended searches . . . in the name of due process." Mullane, 
339 U.S. at 317.  A debtor does not have a "duty to search out 
each conceivable or possible creditor and urge that person or 
entity to make a claim against it."  In re Charter Co., 125 B.R. 
650, 654 (M.D. Fla. 1991). 
 Precedent demonstrates that what is required is not a 
vast, open-ended investigation.  See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317 
("Nor do we consider it unreasonable for the State to dispense 
with more certain notice to those beneficiaries whose interests 
are either conjectural or future or, although they could be 
discovered upon investigation, do not in due course of business 
come to knowledge of the common trustee."); see also Trump Taj 
Mahal Assocs. v. O'Hara (In re Trump Taj Mahal Assocs.), 1993 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17827 at *9 (D.N.J.  Dec. 13, 1993) (explaining 
that "those creditors who hold only conceivable, conjectural or 
speculative claims" are unknown).  The requisite search instead 
focuses on the debtor's own books and records.  Efforts beyond a 
careful examination of these documents are generally not 
required.2  Only those claimants who are identifiable through a 
                                                           
2
 Although some courts have held, regardless of the 
circumstances, that the "reasonably ascertainable" standard 
requires only an examination of the debtor's books and records, 
without an analysis of the specific  facts of each case, see 
e.g., In Re Best Products Co., l40 B.R. 353, 358 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
l992); In re Texaco, Inc., l82 B.R. 937, 955 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
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diligent search are "reasonably ascertainable" and hence "known" 
creditors. 
 In the instant case, the bankruptcy court failed to 
apply the "reasonably ascertainable" standard.  It instead 
crafted a "reasonably foreseeable" test from dictum in In re 
Brooks Fashion Stores, Inc., 124 B.R. 436 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
In applying this test, the bankruptcy court found that "Chemetron 
knew or should have known that it was reasonably foreseeable that 
it could suffer claims from individuals living near the Bert 
Avenue Dump. . . ."  It therefore found that claimants were known 
creditors. 
 We hold that in substituting a broad "reasonably 
foreseeable" test for the "reasonably ascertainable" standard, 
the bankruptcy court applied an incorrect rule of law.  This 
constitutes clear error.  The bankruptcy court's expansive test 
departed from established rules of law and produced a result in 
conflict with other decisions.  See In re New York Trap Rock 
Corp., 153 B.R. 642, 646 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding 
government agency that failed to file claim for environmental 
cleanup to be an "unknown creditor" even where debtor had entered 
real estate contract with another agency of same governmental 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
l995), we do not construe it so narrowly.  Situations may arise 
when creditors are "reasonably ascertainable," although not 
identifiable through the debtor's books and records.  See, e.g., 
Tulsa Professional Collection Serv., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. at 
49l (hospital's claim against deceased patient's estate possibly 
reasonably ascertainable).  We need not address this possibility 
precisely, because, as we discuss, plantiffs' claims in this case 
are so speculative that the identities of the plaintiffs could 
not be ascertained with "reasonably diligent efforts."  
Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 798, n.4. 
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entity); see also In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., 182 B.R. 102, 
106 (D. Del. 1995) (holding claim unknown where plaintiffs had 
not filed suit until one year after bar claims date); In re 
Texaco Inc., 182 B.R. 937, 954-55 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding 
claim unknown where owners of adjacent land filed environmental 
action after bar claims date); In re Hunt, 146 B.R. 178, 182 
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992) (holding claims unknown where plaintiffs 
filed state court suit and counterclaim after bar claims date). 
Even if we were writing on a blank slate, we would reject the 
bankruptcy court's expansive standard.  Put simply, such a test 
would place an impossible burden on debtors. 
 A review of the facts in the case at bar reveals why 
the bankruptcy court's standard should not be followed.  None of 
the claimants involved currently resides near either site.  The 
claimants instead are scattered across Ohio and as far away as 
Texas.  We are hard-pressed to conceive of any way the debtor 
could identify, locate, and provide actual notice to these 
claimants. 
 It has been suggested that Chemetron could have 
conducted a title search on all properties surrounding the sites 
to determine all persons who might have lived in the area during 
the twenty years between Chemetron's operation of the sites and 
the Chapter 11 proceeding.  We decline to chart a jurisprudential 
course through a Scylla of causational difficulties and a 
Charybdis of practical concerns. 
 The causational difficulties are manifold and apparent. 
Under the bankruptcy court's rule, the debtor would have to 
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notify all reasonably foreseeable claimants, a determination that 
would rise and fall on potentially attenuated and certainly 
ambiguous causal nexi.  At the most basic level, it remains 
unclear in the instant case what geographic area might be 
affected and hence how great an expanse the debtor's title search 
need cover.  There is no indication whether a sufficient search 
would address properties one mile from the sites or one hundred 
miles away.  The geographic area would presumably be affected by 
the potential for contaminant migration by air, water, or other 
carrier, further expanding the necessary notification area.  Nor 
is the temporal dimension any more defined.  With lingering 
contaminants and slow rates of decay, there would be no reason to 
limit future debtors to searching only for those exposed during 
their periods of ownership.  And while we might be urged to bring 
these determinations under Mullane's "reasonably calculated under 
the circumstances" umbrella, 339 U.S. at 314, we hesitate to 
thrust the judiciary into a domain where decisions turn on rarely 
pellucid and often disputed scientific studies, requiring 
different varieties of technical expertise from case to case.  In 
light of these problems of causation, the bankruptcy court's rule 
is unworkable. 
 We also anticipate grave practical difficulties with 
the bankruptcy court's broad notice requirement.  Even if 
Chemetron had been required to search all potentially relevant 
title documents, its efforts would have come to no avail in this 
case.  The vast majority of the claimants involved here were not 
property owners, but guests.  No title search could reveal the 
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identity of claimants who merely visited houses in the vicinity 
of the sites at some point in the distant past, and we decline to 
impose any Orwellian monitoring requirements on Chemetron and 
similarly situated corporations.  Moreover, as demonstrated by 
the claimants here, debtors also face the problem of identifying 
all individuals whose parents might have lived in or visited 
houses in the vicinity of the site.  And the problems of 
ascertaining, let alone notifying, all such persons implicate yet 
again all the difficulties of causation previously discussed. 
 Such an investigation, which would be required by the 
bankruptcy court's finding that claimants are known creditors, 
clearly contradicts both the caselaw cited above and common 
sense.  Creditors cannot be required to provide actual notice to 
anyone who potentially could have been affected by their actions; 
such a requirement would completely vitiate the important goal of 
prompt and effectual administration and settlement of debtors' 
estates.  We reject the "reasonably foreseeable" test and follow 
the "reasonably ascertainable" standard. 
 In reaching this result, we are not unsympathetic to 
the alleged injury suffered by the claimants in this case.  We 
stress that our holding addresses the burden placed on the 
bankruptcy debtor to provide actual notice to potential 
claimants, not the merits of a timely and properly filed tort 
suit.  Where a debtor has sought the protection of bankruptcy 
law, however, procedural protections such as the bar claims date 
apply.  These provisions cannot be circumvented by forcing 
debtors to anticipate speculative suits based on lengthy chains 
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of causation.  Accordingly, the bankruptcy court erred in finding 
that the claimants in this case were "known" creditors, and the 
district court's decision reversing the bankruptcy court on this 
finding will therefore be affirmed. 
IV. 
 Having held that claimants were "unknown" creditors, we 
have little difficulty holding that the notice which Chemetron 
published in the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal was 
sufficient.  It is well established that, in providing notice to 
unknown creditors, constructive notice of the bar claims date by 
publication satisfies the requirements of due process.  New York, 
344 U.S. at 296.  Such notice must be "reasonably calculated, 
under the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the 
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present 
their objections."  Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314.  We find that 
Chemetron's notice met this standard.   
 Claimants argue that, given Chemetron's ongoing 
difficulties in cleaning up the Cleveland area sites as well as 
Chemetron's knowledge of the hazardous materials deposited there, 
Chemetron should have published notice in a Cleveland area paper. 
This argument fails. 
 "It is impracticable . . . to expect a debtor to 
publish notice in every newspaper a possible unknown creditor may 
read."  Best Products, 140 B.R. at 358.  Publication in national 
newspapers is regularly deemed sufficient notice to unknown 
creditors, especially where supplemented, as here, with notice in 
papers of general circulation in locations where the debtor is 
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conducting business.  See, e.g., Brown v. Seaman Furniture Co., 
171 B.R. 26 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding publication in local and 
national editions of the New York Times sufficient notice to 
claimant in Pennsylvania); In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & 
Pacific R.R. Co., 112 B.R. 920 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (holding 
publication notice in the Wall Street Journal adequate under 
bankruptcy law);  Wright v. Placid Oil Co., 107 B.R. 104 (N.D. 
Tex. 1989) (holding publication in The Wall Street Journal 
sufficient notice to unknown creditor injured in Louisiana). 
Furthermore, claimants' argument is undermined by the fact that 
none of the claimants resided near the Cleveland sites at the 
time of the publication notice.  Even publication in a Cleveland 
newspaper would not have reached the claimants currently residing 
in Texas or any other potential claimants who had moved away from 
Cleveland. 
 Because Chemetron's publication notice was reasonably 
designed to reach all interested parties, the district court's 
finding that the notice was sufficient to apprise unknown parties 
of the claims bar date is affirmed. 
V. 
 Although we find little merit in claimants' notice 
arguments, we believe their claim of "excusable neglect" received 
inadequate consideration.  Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b)(1) empowers a 
bankruptcy court to permit a creditor to file a late claim if the 
movant's failure to comply with an earlier deadline "was the 
result of excusable neglect."  See Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v. 
Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 113 S. Ct. 
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1489, 1491-92 (1993).  In the instant case, because claimants are 
unknown creditors and Chemetron's publication notice was 
sufficient, claimants must show that their failure to file in a 
timely manner was due to "excusable neglect;" otherwise, their 
claims arising pre-petition will be barred.  See Best Products, 
140 B.R. at 359.  
 The determination whether a party's neglect of a bar 
date is "excusable" is essentially an equitable one, in which 
courts are to take into account all relevant circumstances 
surrounding a party's failure to file.  See Pioneer, 113 S. Ct. 
at 1498.  The considerations to be weighed include: 
 
the danger of prejudice to the debtor, the length of 
the delay and its potential impact on judicial 
proceedings, the reason for the delay, including 
whether it was within the reasonable control of the 
movant, and whether the movant acted in good faith. 
Id.3 
 The bankruptcy court, in considering whether claimants 
should be permitted to file a late claim under the totality of 
the circumstances, wrote: 
 
                                                           
3
 As the district court properly noted, it is unsettled 
whether "excusable neglect remains a viable defense for filing a 
late proof of claim when the claimant is entitled to only 
publication notice."  Chemetron, 170 B.R. at 89 (citing Trump Taj 
Mahal Assocs. v. O'Hara (In re Trump Taj Mahal Assocs.), 1993 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17827 at *18 n.7 (D.N.J. Dec. 13, 1993)). 
 Under Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b), which allows the 
bankruptcy court to permit a late filing in cases of "excusable 
neglect," no differentiation is made between known and unknown 
creditors.  Accordingly, claimants are not foreclosed from 
pursuing an "excusable neglect" defense in the instant matter.    
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This court's understanding of In re Remington Rand is 
that acting promptly and diligently is but one factor 
when a court is considering the totality of the 
circumstances.  The court finds that [claimants], while 
not acting very promptly or diligently, were not so 
sluggish as to outweigh the fact that Chemetron did not 
provide reasonably calculated notice to alert 
[claimants] of the bankruptcy proceedings and the 
claims Bar Date.  Therefore, the totality of the 
circumstances dictate that [claimants] are entitled to 
file a late claim. 
Jones v. Chemetron Corp. (In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc.), Ch. 11 
Case No. 88-00448 JLC, Adv. No. 92-2418, slip op. at 11 (Bankr. 
W.D. Pa. July 24, 1993).  This analysis failed to adequately 
consider the totality of the circumstances presented.  Not only 
was the bankruptcy court incorrect in its assumption that 
claimants were known creditors entitled to actual notice, but the 
court failed to make additional relevant factual findings, 
including the danger of prejudice to the debtor, the length of 
the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, the 
reason for the delay, and whether the movant acted in good faith. 
 On appeal, the district court undertook its own review 
of the record to determine whether the totality of the 
circumstances supported claimants' filing of late claims.  The 
district court wrote: 
 
We agree with the Bankruptcy Court that [claimants] did 
not act promptly or diligently.  Their motion to file a 
late claim occurred more than four years after the bar 
date, two years after the Plan of Reorganization had 
been confirmed and twelve years after media and 
neighborhood attention first focused on the hazardous 
substances at the Bert Avenue Site.  That [claimants] 
were allegedly unaware of their claims does not 
constitute excusable neglect.  To permit [claimants] to 
file a late claim would prejudice Chemetron by denying 
a "fresh start" to which it is entitled.  We conclude 
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that the totality of the circumstances weighs heavily 
against late filing of [claimants'] claims. 
Chemetron, 170 B.R. at 89-90 (citations omitted). 
 Although the totality of the circumstances analysis 
conducted by the district court was more appropriate than that 
conducted by the bankruptcy court, the district court's analysis 
also fell short of that required under Pioneer.  The district 
court failed to undertake a comprehensive analysis of how the 
claimants' late filing would prejudice Chemetron, and also failed 
to consider the role that Chemetron might have played in 
contributing to the delay.  Accordingly, we remand this issue to 
the bankruptcy court, with directions that the bankruptcy court 
undertake a more comprehensive and thorough determination of 
whether the totality of the circumstances support claimants' 
defense of "excusable neglect." 
VI. 
 Finally, we disagree with the district court's 
treatment of the discharge issue.  In the final paragraph of its 
memorandum and order, the district court concluded that the 
instant claims "were dischargeable and were discharged." 
Chemetron, 170 B.R. at 90.  The bankruptcy court, however, had 
declined to reach the issue of discharge, deciding instead to 
dismiss claimants' adversary proceeding without prejudice.  In 
fact, the district court itself noted that "[t]he Bankruptcy 
Court reserved ruling on the issue whether Appellants' claims are 
discharged in light of the permission to file the late claims." 
19 
Id. at 86.  We hold that the district court improperly reached 
the issue of discharge. 
 Chemetron contends that the issue of discharge was 
properly before the district court because Chemetron, in its 
notice of appeal to the district court, expressly appealed from 
the memorandum opinion and final order of the bankruptcy court in 
both the Chapter 11 proceeding and "the related Adversary 
Proceeding."  This reference to the adversary proceeding, 
however, was not sufficient to create jurisdiction in the 
district court.  Because the bankruptcy court reserved ruling on 
the issue of discharge, the bankruptcy court's dismissal without 
prejudice was not a final appealable order under 28 U.S.C. 
§158(d) and therefore was not properly before the district court. 
Accordingly, we will vacate the district court's ruling on 
discharge and remand this issue to the bankruptcy court.   
VII. 
 For these reasons, we will affirm the district court's 
rulings that claimants were known creditors and that Chemetron's 
publication notice was sufficient.  We will vacate and remand to 
the bankruptcy court the district court's judgment that claimants 
failed to demonstrate excusable neglect.  We will also vacate and 
remand to the bankruptcy court the district court's ruling on 
discharge. 
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Chemetron v. Jones 
No. 94-3371 
SAROKIN, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment. 
 
 I concur with the majority's judgment to affirm.  I 
write separately, however, because I disagree with the majority's 
analysis regarding the definition of a "known" creditor entitled 
to actual notice under the law.  The majority rejects the 
"reasonably foreseeable" test in favor of the "reasonably 
ascertainable" test.  I believe that both are applicable. 
 
I. 
 The "reasonably foreseeable" test determines which 
persons are entitled to receive notice.  The "reasonably 
ascertainable" test determines the type of notice these persons 
are entitled to receive.  All reasonably foreseeable claimants 
are entitled to receive some form of notice.  Those who are 
reasonably ascertainable are entitled to actual notice.  Those 
who are not are entitled to constructive notice -- usually some 
form of publication reasonably calculated to reach them. 
 The bankruptcy court adopted the following standard to 
evaluate who qualifies as a known creditor in a bankruptcy 
proceeding: 
[I]f at the time of the filing it is 
reasonably foreseeable to a debtor, who is or 
should be aware of the potential consequences 
of its actions, that a party that is 
foreseeable will most likely file a claim 
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against the debtor, that party is a "known" 
creditor of the debtor.  Furthermore, the 
fact that a debtor does not know the name and 
address of a creditor does not prevent that 
creditor from being "known." 
In re Allegheny International, Inc., No. 88-00448, typescript at 
5-6 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. July 14, 1993).  The court's standard would 
entitle a party whose claim was "reasonably foreseeable" to 
actual notice irrespective of whether or not that party's name 
and address was readily ascertainable.  That result is not only 
illogical; it is contrary to Supreme Court jurisprudence.  Tulsa 
Professional Collection Serv., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 490 
(1988). 
 I do not believe, however, that in restoring the 
"ascertainable" test to its proper place, as the majority does, 
we need go so far as to discard the "reasonably foreseeable" 
standard entirely.  These tests are not mutually exclusive, or 
even at odds.  They address separate issues.  The "reasonably 
foreseeable" test has to do with whether the debtor knew or 
should have known that a claim would be brought; the "reasonably 
ascertainable" test has to do with the debtor's ability to learn 
the identity and location of the potential claimant or claimants. 
 The manufacturer of a product which it knows to be 
defective and who filed for bankruptcy should be under an 
obligation to give actual notice of the proceedings to known 
purchasers and users of its products, even if they have made no 
claim.  They may not have done so because the injury had not yet 
manifested itself or they otherwise were unaware of the risks of 
such injury.  Absent such requirement, if the harmful effects of 
22 
the product did not manifest themselves for some period of time, 
consumers could be barred from relief for their injuries. 
 A rule whereby individuals whose claims are reasonably 
foreseeable are deemed "known" creditors if their identity and 
location is reasonably ascertainable would go a long way toward 
addressing these interests.  Under such a rule, the following two 
steps would be required as a prerequisite to mandating actual 
notice to the tort claimants.  First, the claims must be 
reasonably foreseeable.  If they are reasonably foreseeable, then 
actual notice must be given to those claimants who are reasonably 
ascertainable.  If there is a class or category of foreseeable 
claimants whose identity and/or location cannot be reasonably 
ascertained, then they are not "known creditors" entitled to 
actual notice (although they should receive substituted notice 
through reasonable means most likely to reach them).  Such a 
result strikes the proper balance between the various purposes of 
bankruptcy law, which is concerned not merely with affording a 
fresh start to those who warrant it, but also with protecting the 
interests of creditors and claimants who may be adversely 
affected by the bankruptcy proceeding. 
 This result is clearly supported by the case law.  The 
Mullane court was careful to limit its holding to the facts of 
that case, noting that "certain notice" was unnecessary for 
"beneficiaries whose interests are either conjectural or future . 
. . in view of the character of the proceedings and the nature of 
the interests  here involved."  Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & 
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317 (1950) (emphasis added). 
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Furthermore, a claimant's interests are not "conjectural or 
future" simply because a lawsuit has not been filed yet.  These 
interests exist from the time of the tortious act, not just from 
the time the claimant seeks to vindicate them in court.4 
 
II. 
 Under this rule, I would find that it was not 
reasonably foreseeable that plaintiffs would file claims against 
Chemetron.  As the district court noted in its opinion, 
throughout the early 1980s both the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
and the Environmental Protection Agency time and again reassured 
both Chemetron and local residents that the radiations from the 
Bert Avenue site presented no serious safety or health risk to 
the surrounding neighborhood.  Chemetron Corp. v. Jones, et al., 
No. 93-1582, typescript at 11 (W.D. Penn. June 11, 1994). 
Therefore, "[i]f Chemetron gave any thought to the subject, it 
                                                           
4
  The majority cites Trump Taj Mahal Assocs. v. O'Hara (In re 
Trump Taj Mahal Assocs.), 1993 WL 534494 (D.N.J. Dec. 13, 1993), 
for the proposition that "those creditors who hold only 
conceivable, conjectural, or speculative claims" are unknown.  
See Majority Opinion, typescript at 9.  Trump Taj Mahal is a 
memorandum opinion by a district court, not reported in the 
relevant Reporter. As a district court opinion, it is not binding 
upon us.  As an unreported memorandum opinion, it has no 
precedential value. 
 The Supreme Court, in Tulsa Professional Collection 
Serv., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988) held that "it is 
reasonable to dispense with actual notice to those with mere 
'conjectural' claims."  Id. at 490 (emphasis added).  The Random 
House College Dictionary describes "conjectural" as "of the 
nature of or involving conjecture; problematical."  Insofar as 
"problematical" suggests that the event is more likely than not 
not to occur, a claim that is "reasonably foreseeable" is not 
"problematical." 
24 
was reasonable to assume that claims would not be filed because 
of the assurances of these agencies that the Bert Avenue Site 
posed no health risk to the neighborhood."  Id.  Therefore, 
"there was no reason for Chemetron to assume in 1988 that there 
would be claims from residents for ailments caused by exposure to 
the contamination from the Sites.  At most, any future claim was 
speculative."  Id. at 12.  Under the facts of this case, I 
entirely agree with the district court's conclusion that 
"Appellees were not foreseeable claimants and, accordingly, were 
unknown creditors."  Id.  Since the claims were not foreseeable 
there is no reason to address whether the claimants were 
reasonably ascertainable. 
 
III. 
 For the reasons stated above, I concur with the 
majority's judgment, though not with its reasoning in this one 
respect. 
